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Whatever has value in our world now does not
have value in itself, according to its nature –
Nature is always value-less, but has been given
value at some time as a present – and it was we
who gave and bestowed it. Only we have created
the world that concerns man! (Nietzsche, 1882/1974:
§301)1
An empirical method which remains true to nature
does not “save”; it is not an insurance device nor a
mechanical antiseptic. But it inspires the mind
with courage and vitality to create new ideals and
values in the face of the perplexities of a new
world. (LW 1: 4)
 
Introduction
1 Let us focus on the following famous passage from Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1873/1999) “On
Truth  and  Lying  in  a  Non-Moral  Sense”:  “What,  then,  is  truth?  A  mobile army  of
metaphors,  metonyms,  and  anthropomorphisms”  (§ 1).  We  will  see  that  John  Dewey
entirely agrees with this statement. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Johnson (2007) make
extensive use of Dewey in presenting their theory of metaphor. In so doing, they mobilize
an army of metaphors, metonyms, and, by grounding their theory on embodied action,
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embrace perspectival anthropomorphism. While strongly endorsing this approach, I take
a different route. 
2 Nietzsche has a rich and novel understanding of metaphor and metonymy that he uses to
comprehend the creation of the identity of things, free will, causation, and necessity as
serving anthropomorphic  purposes.  So  does  Dewey.  The  result  of  our  inquiry  is  a
surprisingly  poetic  and  rhetorical  interpretation  of  Dewey  that  should  not  astonish
anyone  who  reads  him  carefully.2 We  arrive  at  this  radical  reading  of  Deweyan
pragmatism by  a metaphorical  transfer  from Nietzsche  as  the  more  familiar  source
domain to Dewey as the target domain.3
3 We will call attention to the primordial role of artistic creation in Dewey’s philosophy of
reconstruction. In his essay, “Construction and Criticism,” Dewey writes:
I  have  used  the  word  construction  rather  than  creation  because  it  seems  less
pretentious. But what I mean by it is the creative mind, the mind that is genuinely
productive in its operations. We are given to associating creative mind with persons
regarded as rare and unique, like geniuses. But every individual is in his own way
unique. (LW 5: 127)
4 I will be a bit more pretentious and use “creation” where Dewey would have preferred
“construction.”
5 My conclusion presents Dewey as a gay scientist joining Nietzsche in making creative use
of the genetic method.4 They also use the genetic method to keep track of what human
inquiry  has  created  even  when  it  becomes  “exapted”  from  its  original  purpose  or
function.5 All  along the way, things will  fall  into place if  we carefully distinguish the
experience of existence from the cognitive linguistic meanings, identities, and essences we
create from our experience.6
 
Experience, Qualities, Metaphor, and Metonymy 
6 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “metaphor” as: “The figure of speech in which a name
or descriptive term is transferred to some object different from, but analogous to, that to
which it is properly applicable; an instance of this is a metaphorical expression.”7 In his
Rhetorik Nietzsche (1872-1873/1989)  says  of  metaphor  that  it  “does  not  produce new
words, but gives a new meaning to them” (23).8 This is not very helpful since we are not
that interested in words per se. He does cite Aristotle’s famous definition approvingly: “a
metaphor is the carrying over of a word whose usual meaning is something else, either
from the genus to the species, from the species to the genus, from species to species, or
according to proportion” (Rh: 55). However, as Alan D. Schrift (1990), indicates, Nietzsche
breaks the bounds of Aristotle’s restriction of metaphor to linguistic conveyance to 
[…] regard any transference from one sphere to another (e.g., physical to spiritual,
literal  to  figurative,  audible  to  visual,  subject  to  object,  etc.)  as  an  instance  of
metaphor. (126)
7 “Whereas every metaphor standing for a sensuous perception is individual and unique
and is therefore always able to escape classification,” according to Nietzsche (1873/1999),
“the great edifice of concepts exhibits the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium” (§1).
Thus, for Nietzsche, categories, concepts, identities, and kinds 
[…] are only the left-over residue of a metaphor, and… the illusion produced by the
artistic translation of a nervous stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then at
least the grandmother of each and every concept. (§ 1)
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8 Nietzsche (1901/1967) is a philosopher of embodiment who insists: “Essential: to start
from the body and employ it as a guide. It is the much richer phenomenon, which allows
of clearer observation” (§ 532). Drawing on Dewey’s embodied aesthetic, in The Meaning of
the Body, Johnson boldly (2007) asserts: “Meaning is grounded in our bodily experience” (12).
Schrift  identifies  a  “three-stage  metaphorical  translation”  from  embodied  empirical
perception to logical conception in Nietzsche’s texts (Schrift 1990: 126). Here are the first
two stages:
The stimulation of a nerve is first translated into an image: first metaphor! The
image, in turn is imitated in a sound: second metaphor! (Nietzsche, (1873/1999: § 1)
9 The third metaphorical  translation is  from sound (e.g.,  word)  to concept:  “The word
contains nothing but an image; from this comes the concept” (Nietzsche, 1979: § 55). The
second two phases of this embodied understanding of metaphor somewhat resembles
that  of  Lakoff  and Johnson (1999)  and Johnson (2007),  who conceive metaphors as  a
mapping of entities and relations from sensorimotor “image schemas” as source domains
to abstract target domains. It nicely captures the hyphen in Dewey’s hyphenated phrase
“body-mind” (see LW 1: Ch. 7).9 Nietzsche (1979) observes, “this must be an artistic power,
because it is creative. Its chief creative means are omitting, overlooking, ignoring.” (§ 55).10
10 We will find Dewey makes comparable moves. Finally, Nietzsche mentions, “metaphor is a
shortened simile, as the simile as metaphor pleonazousa [metaphor being exaggerated]”
(§ 55).  We  will  be  primarily  interested  in  metaphor  pleonazousa operating  upon
experienced qualities.
11 The  Oxford  English  Dictionary (OED) defines  metonymy  as:  “A  figure  of  speech  which
consists  in substituting for the name of  a thing the name of  an attribute of  it  or of
something closely related.”
12 Nietzsche (1872-1873/1989) defines metonymy as “the substitution of cause and effect”
(25). Later he expands the definition:
Metonymy,  the  placement  of  one  noun  for  another,  also  called  hypollegē  [an
interchange, exchange], cuius vis est, pro eo quod dicitur causam propter quam dicitur
ponere [the substitution of the cause for which we say a thing in place of the thing
to  which  we  refer].  It  is  very  powerful  in  speech:  the  abstract  substantiva are
qualities inside us and around us, which are torn away from their substrata and set
forth as independent essences. (Nietzsche (1872-1873/1989: 59)
13 The reference to qualities, causation, and essences will engage us when we turn to Dewey.
We will be especially interested in metonymy in the form of synecdoche, which the Oxford
English Dictionary defines as: 
A figure by which a more comprehensive term is used for a less comprehensive or
vice versâ; as whole for part or part for whole, genus for species or species for genus,
etc.
 
Metaphor and Metonymy in the Creation of Identical
Objects
14 Nietzsche’s stance arises from his commitment to Heraclitian becoming, which, according
to the standard account of his development, emerges from his reading of the early field
theorist Roger Boscovich, evolutionary theory (Ernst Haeckel and Wilhelm Roux), and the
neo-Kantian F. A. Lange. On this account, Schopenhauer sways Nietzsche from philology
to  philosophy  in  the  mid-1860’s.  He  then  works  with  a  Kantian-Schopenhauerian
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structure  that  assumes a  skeptical  appearance versus  reality  dualism in which truth
(concepts,  etc.)  necessarily falsifies  reality (i.e.,  “the thing-in-itself”),  which he never
abandons. “On Truth and Lying” comes from his early period. With his reading of Lange
especially,  Nietzsche  rejects  Kant  and  Schopenhauer’s  metaphysics  that  emphasized
logical and conceptual priority to a static world of things-in-themselves for a temporal,
evolutionary, and physiological priority wherein chaos and becoming replace das Ding an
sich, but  he  retains  his  pessimistic,  dualistic  epistemology.  Such  an  account  leaves
Nietzsche at odds with Dewey. 
15 However, there are problems with the received account that will become evident as we
move forward. For one thing, there is Nietzsche’s (1873/1998) “Philosophy in the Tragic
Age of the Greeks,” which was written in 1873, although never published in his lifetime.11
Here,  we  find  Nietzsche  already  expressing  Heraclitian  views  critical  of  Kant  and
Schopenhauer’s  metaphysical  and  moral  interpretation  of  the  world  while  exploring
becoming, naturalism, and anti-dualism. My paper will show that like Dewey, Nietzsche
eventually abandoned the appearance versus reality dualism of not only of Kant, but also
Lange, and with it the skeptical view of truth as falsifying reality. However, truth remains
a  “mobile  army  of  metaphors,  metonyms,  and  anthropomorphisms”  because  all
meanings, essences, and values are human creations. There are no metaphysical world of
“things”  (substances,  οὐσία)  or  chaos  (χάος)  antecedent  to  inquiry  to  which  our
constructions correspond. There is just existence as we experience it and what we make
of it. What is crucial is that we distinguish existence and essence without constructing a
distorting dualism between them.
16 Every individual, every particular is unequivocally unique in its existence. We construct
identity  from  similarities  by  ignoring  differences  that  might  matter  given  other
perspectives and purposes:
Every concept comes into being by making equivalent what is non-equivalent. Just
as it is certain that no leaf is ever exactly the same as any other leaf, it is equally
certain that the concept “leaf” is formed by dropping these individual differences
arbitrarily, by forgetting those feature which differentiate one thing from another,
so that the concept then gives rise to the notion that something other than leaves
exists in nature, something which would be “leaf,” a primal form, say, from which
all leaves were woven… (Nietzsche, 1873/1999: §1)
17 The process is “anthropomorphic through and through” (§1).  According to Nietzsche,
nothing ever occurs twice empirically.12 Nietzsche is influenced by Heraclitus:
Heraclitus somewhere says that all things are in process and nothing stays still, and
likening existing things to the stream of a river he says that you would not step
twice into the same river. (Plato, Cratylus 402a; see KR, 197)
18 Similar remarks hold for leaves. “Like form,” Nietzsche (1873/1999) concludes, “a concept
is produced by overlooking what is individual and real” (§ 1).13
19 Nietzsche (1901/1967) insists that the identity of objects is something made, not found:
It is we who created the “thing,” the “identical thing,” subject, attribute, activity,
object, substance, form, after we had long pursued the process of making identical,
course and simple. (§ 521)
20 Again,
Before there is  “thought” there must  have been “invention,”  the construction of
identical cases, of the appearance of sameness is more primitive than the knowledge
of sameness. (§ 544)
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21 It will become clear that for Dewey, the identity of objects is a creative product of the
process of inquiry.
22 Dewey understands the limits of language when confronted by the richness of experience
as well as Nietzsche:
A  universe  of  experience  is  the  precondition  of  a  universe  of  discourse…  The
universe of experience surrounds and regulates the universe of discourse but never
appears as such within the latter. (LW 12: 74)
23 He remarks:
Language comes infinitely short of paralleling the variegated surface of nature. Yet
words  as  practical  devices  are  the  agencies  by  which  the  ineffable  diversity  of
natural existence as it operates in human experience is reduced to orders, ranks,
and  classes  that  can  be  managed… The  unique  quality  of  a  quality  is  found  in
experience  itself;  it  is  there  and sufficiently  there  not  to  need reduplication  in
language.  The  latter  serves  its  scientific  or  its  intellectual  purpose  as  it  gives
directions as to how to come upon these qualities in experience. (LW 10: 219)
24 The transfer from the sensuous qualities of existential experience to linguistic meanings
and logical essences involves the use of metaphor, especially synecdoche and simile; that
is, taking a part (language and logic) for the whole of human experience.14
25 Like  Nietzsche’s  leaf,  Dewey  insists  the  sensuous  perception  of  immediate  anoetic
existential quality never recurs exactly the same twice:
Such immediate qualities as red and blue, sweet and sour, tone, the pleasant and
unpleasant, depend upon an extraordinary variety and complexity of conditioning
events; hence they are evanescent. They are never exactly reduplicated, because
the exact combination of events of which they are termini does not precisely recur.
(LW 1: 95)
26 Recurrent  identity  is  only  a  functional  equivalence  within  a  discursive  system:  “No
quality as such occurs twice.  What recurs is  the constancy of  the evidential  force of
existences which, as occurrences, are unique” (LW 12: 319). Identity is the product of a
creative process.
27 Let us follow Dewey’s genetic trace of the creation of identical objects as instances of a
kind from its origins in sensuous qualitative experience. When we are done, we will see
why he says:
The name objects will be reserved for subject-matter so far as it has been produced
and ordered  in  settled  form by  means  of  inquiry;  proleptically,  objects  are  the
objectives of  inquiry… For  things  exist  as  objects  for  us  only  as  they have been
previously determined as outcomes of inquiries. (LW 12: 122)
28 Dewey thinks the identity of objects is something made not found.
29 Dewey  condemns  what  he  calls  “the philosophic  fallacy”  by  which  he  means  the
“conversion of  eventual  functions  into  antecedent  existence”  whether  performed on
“behalf  of  mathematical  subsistences,  esthetic  essences,  the  purely  physical  order  of
nature, or God” (LW 1: 389). By functions, Dewey means something having a determinate
function within inquiry such as being data, characteristic traits, properties, and objects of
a kind. Such production is a creative activity. In his 1938 Logic, he indicates: “In the early
history of Greek reflective thought, art, or techne, and science, were synonymous” (LW 12:
77). Recall that for the ancient Greeks, techne was the form of skilled knowledge of poiesis
(making, creating, calling into existence). Nietzsche and Dewey would like us to return to
these classical connotations. Dewey explicitly rejects the theory versus practice dualism
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and insists that all reason is practical reason: “Rationality as an abstract conception is
precisely the generalized idea of the means-consequence relation as such” (LW 12: 17).15
In our conclusion, we will call Dewey’s genetic production account “gay science.”
30 Let us concentrate on the creation of objects as instances of kinds. Realists assume kinds
are  natural  if  their  classifications,  taxonomies,  and so  on  correspond to  antecedently
existing, fixed, and final groupings of substances in nature apart from human practices.
They  commit  “the philosophic  fallacy.”  Like  Nietzsche,  Dewey  famously  rejected  the
metaphysical correspondence theory of truth. According to Nietzsche (1878/1986),
[…]  Logic too depends on presuppositions with which nothing in the real  world
corresponds, for example on the presupposition that there are identical things, that
the same thing is identical at different points of time. (Vol. I: § 11)
31 Nietzsche and Dewey are pluralistic perspectival empirical naturalists who reject mental
representations as mirrors of nature.
32 Dewey explicitly  discards the appearance versus reality dualism in “The Postulate of
Immediate Empiricism” (MW 3: 158-67). Nietzsche (1889/2005) does the same in “How
The ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” (171). Both dismiss the spectator stance that
places a veil of representations between the knower and the known for a participant
stance where the knower becomes a participant in the events of existence and creators
not discoverers of meaning and value.
33 We do not have room to examine both of these breakthrough texts. Clark (1990: 95-125)
shows that at least the last four of the six stages Nietzsche delineates provides a
description of Nietzsche’s own epistemological development. Since he arrives at the same
extraordinarily  original  place  as  Dewey,  we  will  trace  the  outline  of  Nietzsche’s
development upon a path few western philosophers have ever traversed.
34 Nietzsche (1889/2005) delineates six stages. Plato and then Christianity typify the first
two (171). The third is characterized by Kantianism and portrays Nietzsche’s own position
when he embraced Schopenhauer: “The real world, unattainable, indemonstrable, cannot
be promised, but even when merely thought of a consolation, a duty, an imperative”
(171).
35 At this stage, the metaphysical quest for certainty remains an epistemic and moral duty,
although we can never hope to complete it. Following Kant, Nietzsche assumes genuine
objective “Truth” requires correspondence to metaphysical reality in itself; hence, merely
empirical human knowledge necessarily falsifies reality. This is Nietzsche’s stance when
he wrote  “On Truth and Lying,”  although he was  already flirting with a  Heraclitian
critique. Positivism exemplifies the fourth state:
The  real  world  –  unattainable?  Unattained,  at  any  rate.  And  if  unattained  also
unknown. Consequently also no consolation, no redemption, no duty: how could we
have a duty towards something unknown? (171)
36 Clark identifies  this  stage with Nietzsche when he wrote Human,  All  to  Human. Here,
Lange’s  temporal  chaos  becomes  the  thing-in-itself  while  the  naturalistic  priority  of
evolutionary physiology replaces the priority of Kant’s categories and concepts. “Truth”
remains an illusion or fiction because our concepts (or if you prefer our linguistic terms)
fail to correspond to metaphysical reality (see Clark 1990: 79, 121-2). Stack places Lange’s
influence earlier, given developmental continuity, we do not need to be too precise about
transitions (Stack 1983: 94ff.). In any case, Lange’s influence is clearly present in stage 5:
“The ‘real world’ __ an idea no longer of any use, not even a duty any longer – an idea
grown  useless  superfluous,  consequently a  refuted  idea:  let  us  abolish  it!”  (Nietzsche
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1889/2005: 171). Clark correctly identifies this stance with Nietzsche when he wrote Gay
Science and Beyond Good and Evil. The metaphysical world vanishes leaving us with a world
of sensuous appearance. There is no thing-in-itself to which our concepts may refer (see
Clark 1990: 112). As Wilcox remarks, Nietzsche seems to assume that “a statement with
existential import is false if the existential commitment is false” (Wilcox 1986: 352).16 
37 Clark insists “Stage 5 does not bring to an end the ‘longest error’ because its devaluation
of ‘this’ world makes sense only if it ascribes ‘true being’ to another world” (Clark 1990:
113). Thus we are led to the “INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA” of stage 6:
We have abolished the real world: what world is left? The apparent world perhaps?
… But no! with the real  world we have also abolished the apparent world!  (Nietzsche,
1889/2005: 171)
38 Once we deny the “true” world, there are no grounds for portraying the remaining world
as illusory. 
39 Clark concludes that the later Nietzsche completely abandons the skeptical falsificationist
view of truth:
To  deny  the  true  world  [i.e.,  metaphysical  “Truth”]  is  not  to  deny  truth…
Nietzsche’s characterization of truths as illusions or fictions amounts to calling the
empirical world, the world accessible through common sense and science, illusory
or fictitious. His history of the “true” world indicates that he gives up ascribing
reality to any world other than the empirical world (stage 5), and that he recognizes
that this requires him to relinquish his claim that the empirical world is illusory
(stage 6). That he puts the logical consequences of stage 5 in a separate stage gives
strong evidence that Nietzsche later recognized his initial failure to appreciate the
consequences  of  denying  the  thing-in-itself,  which  means that  he  himself  went
through  a  period  in  which  he  denied  the  thing-in-itself,  but  continued  to
characterize the empirical world as mere appearance or illusion. (Clark 1990: 114)
40 With stage six, we break out of the skeptical Kantian cage of Schopenhauer along with the
naturalized neo-Kantian confines of Lange.
41 We create knowledge, along with every “thing” else, from the perspective of our embodied
human needs, interests, and desires. Our finite purposes penetrate both our perceptual
and  conceptual  perspectives.  All  cognitive  comprehension  is  entirely  interpretative.
While the noumenal world will always remain a conceivable possibility, to the pleasure of
radical skeptics, it is a nomic impossibility for the more optimistic or at least meliorist
perspectival  empiricist.  Indeed,  we  derive  even  abstract  conceptual  possibilities  our
perspective as finite human beings. There are no perceptions from nowhere; likewise,
there are no God’s eye view or even the perspective from everywhere:
We cannot look around our corner: it is a hopeless curiosity to want to know what
other kinds of intellects and perspectives there might be… But I think that today we
are at least far away from the ridiculous immodesty of decreeing from our angle
that perspectives are permitted only from this angle. Rather, the world once again
has become infinite to us: insofar as we cannot reject the possibility that it includes
infinite interpretations. (Nietzsche 1882/1974: § 374)
42 All we have is an infinite plurality of non-convergent perspectives we may never hope to
totalize. Nonetheless, the perspectives are all formed from the empirical natural world;
hence,  more or  less  objective depending on the quality of  the inquiry that  warrants
whatever  conclusions  we  may  draw from our  transactions  with  the  other  events  of
existence. The result is a non-metaphysical naturalistic realism of fields and events, not
lumpy substances. In a robust naturalistic, empirical, pluralistic universe, it is impossible
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to comprehend or judge reality as a totalized whole (including the concept of the nominal
world), because we can only comprehend it from our finite human perspectives.
43 Once we drop the notion that representations are an opaque screen separating us from
reality, we may abandon what Dewey calls the “spectator theory” (LW 4: 19, 163, 195) for
a stance wherein human nature is simply another natural event participating among an
endless  array  of  other  events.  We  may  also  abandon  the  epistemological  quest  for
certainty  (LW  4).  Knowledge  (Dewey  preferred  the  phrase  “warranted  assertion”)  is
simply something humans create from their experience of existence that allows them to
survive, thrive, and delight in their own existence. Not just falsifiable, such knowledge is
as contingent as are its creators.
44 Nietzsche and Dewey disparage the notion that experience is a “veil  or screen which
shuts  us  off  from nature”  (LW 1:  11).  Before  overcoming the veil  of  representations
sealing us off from reality, Dewey indicates, we assumed “a reality in Being independently
of the operations of inquiry is the standard and measure of anything said to be known”
(LW 4: 161). The essential difference for Nietzsche and Dewey is that
[…] between a mind which beholds or grasps objects  from outside the world of
things, physical and social, and one which is a participant interacting with other
things and knowing them provided the interaction is regulated in a definable way.
(LW 4: 160)
45 Once we abandon the spectator theory, we may realize that 
[…] any cognitive conclusion depends upon the method by which it is reached, so
that  the  perfecting  of  method,  the  perfecting  of  intelligence,  is  the  thing  of
supreme value (LW 4: 160)
46 Dewey championed the genetic method. 
47 Having dissolved the appearance versus reality dualism,  we may eliminate the chaos
versus cosmos dualism. There is only existence and what meaning makers make of it.
Truth remains a mobile army of tropes only now it creates a world of human (all too
human, sometimes) meanings, essences, and values from existence rather than falsifying
reality.  Again,  matters become clear once we distinguish existence from the distilled
import of existence for our purposes; that is, essences. 
48 In Dewey’s book with Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known, there is a discussion of
“cosmos as fact” (LW 16: 58). Frank X. Ryan reminds us of two things that help us better
understand what Dewey and Bentley mean. He calls attention to this observation:
That Fact is literally or etymologically something done or made has also the advantage
of suggesting that the knowing and identifying, as ways of acting, are as much ways
of doing, of making… as are chopping wood, singing songs, seeing sights or making
hay. (LW 16: 54) 
49 Ryan further indicates, “the Greek word kosmos originally meant a world made intelligible
as  order  is  brought  from  chaos”  (Ryan  2011:  50).  Of  course,  having  abandoned  the
appearance  versus  reality  dualism,  we  may  also  overcome  the  chaos  versus  cosmos
dualism and simply say that a cosmos is whatever we have made that is intelligible to us
from our human participatory perspective. The rest is chaos only because if defies are
comprehension. As Nietzsche states:
The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos – in the sense not
of a lack of necessity but a lack of order, arrangement form, beauty, wisdom, and
whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms. (Nietzsche,
1882/1974: § 109)
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50 Truth as warranted assertion is also an aesthetic anthropomorphism; a mobile army of
tropes that retain an objective basis when well wrought.
51 Experience is in and of nature; however, Nietzsche and Dewey comprehend nature in the
classical Greek sense. Wolfgang Schadewaldt writes,
When we turn to the root word physis, it must first be pointed out that the Greek
term  is  never  used,  as  “nature”  now  is  in  common  speech  and  scientific
terminology, to designate a realm of objects. (Schadewaldt 1979: 160)
52 Having overcome the appearance reality dualism we will recognize that what we know is
inseparable from how we know it, which is why genetic method becomes so important.
We create the identity of objects from the meaningless, albeit real, events of existence as
we experience them. The genetic trace of how we creatively move from an immediate
qualitative existential situation, to data, to characteristic traits,  to the constitution of
objects as instances of what, in a unique sense, are natural kinds is a long and complex
process that occupies most of Dewey’s monumental Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Here, we
only provide an extremely abridged outline.
53 Nietzsche begins with anoetic sensuous images arising out of neurological stimulation.
Dewey  starts  with  “qualities”  that  arise  in  the  same  way.17 This  is  the  primordial
experience of existence devoid of meaning. In “Qualitative Thought,” Dewey writes:
The world in which we immediately live, that in which we strive, succeed, and are
defeated is preeminently a qualitative world. What we act for, suffer, and enjoy are
things  in  their  qualitative  determinations.  This  world  forms  the  field  of
characteristic  modes  of  thinking,  characteristic  in  that  thought  is  definitely
regulated by qualitative considerations. (LW 5: 243)
54 Dewey concludes that “intuition precedes conception and goes deeper… Reflection and
rational elaboration spring from and make explicit a prior intuition…” (LW 5: 249).
55 Dewey does not mean an immediate cognitive intuition (nous, clear and distinct ideas, the
myth of the given, etc.), which he entirely repudiates. However, if we fail to properly
discern a situation for our purposes, discursive thought stumbles.
56 Dewey returns not only to a classical understanding of nature and meaning making, but
also to the primacy of our aesthetic encounter with existence:
If we take advantage of the word esthetic in a wider sense than that of application
to  the  beautiful  and  ugly,  esthetic  quality,  immediate,  final  or  self-enclosed,
indubitably characterizes natural situations as they empirically occur (LW 1: 82)18
57 He then asserts:
Any quality as such is final; it is at once initial and terminal; just what it is as it
exists. It may be referred to other things, it may be treated as an effect or as a sign.
But this involves an extraneous extension and use. (LW 1: 82)
58 We may take the existential quality of smoke and use it as a natural sign of fire, but that
involves an intrusion of our anthropomorphic purposes. Nietzsche would approve:
Our  utterances  by  no  means  wait  until  our  perception  and  experience  have
provided us with a many-sided,  somehow respectable knowledge of things;  they
result  immediately  when  the  impulse  is  perceived.  Instead  of  the  thing,  the
sensation takes in only sign. That is the first aspect: language is rhetoric…(Nietzsche,
1872-1873/1989: § 23)
59 The extraneous use of qualitative experiences or images as signs is the primordial source
of data for the construction of the identity of objects as instances of a kind. It is also an
instance of a metaphor moving from a sensuous image (Nietzsche) or quality (Dewey) as
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the source domain to semiotics as the target domain. Said differently, we create things by
making and using signs.
60 The  ultimate  context  for  any  inquiry  is  some  disrupted,  doubtful,  indeterminate
qualitative situation in which we are participants:
[A] situation is a whole in virtue of its immediately pervasive quality.  When we
describe  it  from the  psychological  side,  we  have  to  say  that  the  situation  as  a
qualitative whole is sensed or felt. Such an expression is, however, valuable only as
it is taken negatively to indicate that it is not, as such, an object in discourse. (LW 12:
73-4)
61 This is important because:
That which is “given” in the strict sense of the word “given,” is the total field or
situation. The given in the sense of the singular, whether object or quality, is the
special  aspect,  phase or constituent of the existentially present situation that is
selected to locate and identify its problematic features with reference to the inquiry
then and there to be executed. In the strict sense, it is taken rather than given. This
fact decides the logical status of data… It embodies a fixation of the problem in a
way which indicates a possible solution. It also helps to provide evidence. (LW 12:
127)
62 We must have something intuitively, anoetically given; no one creates ex nihilo. Taking a
part  (data)  for a whole (total  field)  is  an instance of  a synecdoche.  In a synecdoche,
Nietzsche (1872-1873/1989) perceives, “A partial perception takes the place of the entire
and complete intuition” (23). Data, evidence, and such are all synecdoches.
63 “For purposes of theory,” Dewey finds, 
the important consideration is  that existent things,  as signs,  are evidence of  the
existence of something else, this something being at the time inferred rather than
observed. (LW 12: 58)
64 As such, we may use them to carry out logical inferences for practical purposes that
anthropomorphically involve embodied habits. We may become reflectively aware of our
habits and begin to control them to make dependable conclusions. When this occurs, the
“idea of a method of inquiry arises as an articulate expression of the habit that is involved
in a class of inferences” (LW 12: 19-20). If we can linguistically state the habit of inference,
we may embark on consciously controlled inquiry toward creating the objects that “are
the objectives of inquiry” (LW 12: 19-20).
65 Such qualitative data creatively taken from a larger qualitative whole eventually decides
the identity of objects as instances of natural kinds. Qualities as such never recur; what
“recurs is the constancy of the evidential force of existences which, as occurrences, are
unique” (LW, 12: 319). This is the force of qualitative data taken and creatively used as
evidential signs:
When we say “characteristic trait” we mean precisely that a specified quality is
such as to serve as a diagnostic mark,  an evidential  sign,  of  the presence of an
object of a specified kind. (LW 11: 96)
66 A  kind  is  simply  a  conjunction  of  descriptive  traits:  “Qualities  which  descriptively
determine (distinguish and identify) kinds, I shall indifferently call traits or characteristics
” (LW 12: 259).
67 Critical to the process of inquiry is the “determination of the differential traits which are
evidential  signs  of  one  and  not another  kind”  (LW  12:  196).  Dewey  concludes:  “A
conjunction of traits or a description is the basis of institution of a kind” (LW 12: 240).19
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Kinds  are  tropological  creations  along  the  genetic  path  to  the  creation  of  identical
objects.
68 Every trait is a quality, but only those qualities selectively discriminated from a total field
or situation to function as a sign in inference is a trait: “From the standpoint of existence,
independently of its subjection to inquiry, there is no criterion. Everything in the world is
like everything else in some respects, and is unlike anything else in other respects” (LW
12: 267). Existentially, every simile succeeds, although it may fail for the purposes of a
given inquiry. Consider Dewey’s example:
[T]here are persons who have the quality of being cross-eyed, of being bald and
being shoemakers. Why not form a kind on the basis of these qualities? The answer
is  that  such  a  set  of  conjoined  traits  is  practically  worthless  for  the  purpose  of
inference. (LW 12: 267)
69 Here,  the  simile  as  metaphor  pleonazousa  does  not  work practically  for  the  evidential
purposes of Dewey’s imagined inquiry.20 Nonetheless,  when it  does work, we have an
important instance of the contribution of metaphor to the construction of the identity of
objects as one of a kind, along with propositional attitudes regarding them. “To hold that
cognition is  recognition,” Dewey elsewhere concludes,  “is  to concede that likeness,  a
relation, rather than existence, is central” (LW 1: 249).
70 The following sums up the movement from a given qualitative existential whole, to qualia
selected as evidential data as characteristic traits for inference, to an essential property
we may predicate of objects:
We  are  thus  enabled  to  make  definite  the  logical  differences  between  quality,
characteristic  trait,  and  property…  “Turning  paper  red,”  is,  as  the  object  of  a
particular observation, a quality. As enabling reasonably safe inference to be made
as  to  the  occurrence  of  other  qualities  under  certain  conditions,  it  is  a
distinguishing  trait  or  characteristic  descriptive  of  a  kind.  It  becomes  a  property
when it is determined by negative as well as positive instances to be a constant
dependable sign of other conjoined characteristics. It then belongs inherently to all
cases of the kind. (LW 12: 292)
71 Here,  the  simile  succeeds  practically.21 Blue  and  red  are  existential  qualities.  If  we
perform the chemical existential operation of placing blue litmus paper into a solution
and it  turns red,  the results  provide a strong evidential  sign of  acidic conditions.  In
chemistry, the property “pH” is a precise measurement signifying whether a solution is
an acid or base. An acid has the property of a pH less than 7.22
72 Dewey distinguishes between two kinds of generalization. Generic propositions refer to
kinds  and have existential  spatial-temporal  connections.  They function in  inquiry  to
organize perceptual materials as evidence. Thus far, we have only considered some of the
things that go into the construction of genetic propositions. Universal propositions lack
existential  import;  they  may prove  valid  even when nothing exists  to  provide  them
content. They function in inquiry to propose possible stable and repeatable operations
that,  if  successful,  allow  us  to  resolve  problematic  situations.  The  determination  of
operations involves an abstract universal: 
From the point of view of what has been said, every universal, like any rule, is a
formulation  of  an  operation  to  be  performed.  A  universal  does  not  claim  to
describe; description is in terms of the conjunction of qualities that enable us to
discriminate and identify the kind of which a thing is. (LW 11: 107)
73 Ideas, universals, and the like direct the inventive operations that determine some object
as an instance of a kind.
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74 For Dewey, facts, data, and characteristic traits arise as a consequence of the operations
of inquiry carried out for our practical anthropomorphic purposes.
What is meant by calling facts operational? Upon the negative side what is meant is
that they are not self-sufficient and complete in themselves. They are selected and
described, as we have seen, for a purpose… (LW 12: 116-7)
75 Initially, this is a matter of comparatively noting similarities and differences:
Now it is impossible to define comparison except operationally… It is a name for
any and all of the operations by means of which alleged or provisional data are
determined to be data with respect to the problem set by a given indeterminate
situation… (LW 12: 184-5)
76 If the data is mis-taken, then inference will almost assuredly fail. Furthermore,
[…]  comparison  obviously  involves  selection-rejection,  for  objects  and  events
cannot be compared in toto. The positive import of this fact is that in order to be
compared, subject-matters must be reduced to “parts”: that is, to constituents that
are capable of being treated as of the same kind or homogeneous. To compare is to
pair, and things that are paired are thereby made commensurate with respect to
carrying out some operation in view. (LW 12: 203)
77 Comparison establishes analogies and disanalogies, which involve metaphors, metonyms,
and anthropomorphisms. The operation of reducing wholes to parts obviously employs
synecdoche; “selection-rejection” is perspectival.
78 We cannot make the distinction between generic and universal propositions merely by
inspecting the linguistic form of a proposition. Their difference rests on a more basic
distinction between particular and singular propositions.  A namable particular is  the
spatial and temporal existential quality (red, blue, sweet, or sour) within an anoetically
intuited larger existential qualitative whole. However, “the logical import of a ‘particular’
is  determined by the strictly limited local  and temporal  occurrence of  the quality in
question” (LW 12: 291).
79 Particular propositions, however, are linguistically stable and repeatable:
Propositions of the kind called particular represent the most rudimentary form of
propositions of subject-content. They are propositions which qualify a singular, this,
by a quality proceeding from an operation performed by means of a sense organ.
(LW 12: 289)
80 Data (i.e., evidential signs used for inference) first find linguistic expression as particular
propositions. For example, “this is red” or “this is sweet.” 23 It is a sensory synecdoche
where experience serves as the source domain and language the target.24
81 “The singular is described (discriminated and identified) as one of a kind,” according to
Dewey,
[…]  by means of  a  conjunction of  traits  which make it  like certain other things
already determined and that are likely to occur for determination in the future.
(LW 12: 246)
82 Here, we have a metaphor (specifically, a simile) whereby linguistic descriptions stand for
sensuous  perception  that  is  unique,  one-time-only,  and  escapes  classification.  What
recurs is the kind as a conjunction of descriptive traits arising from systematic, stable,
and repeatable operations (see LW 12: 247). Dewey deliberately eschews the notion that
such  kinds  are  immutable  “eternal  essences”  (i.e.,  substances)  that  supervene  on
experience a priori. They are contingent a posteriori creations.
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83 Singular propositions most commonly take the form of “sugar is sweet” having some
specific  object,  thing,  substance,  and  such  as  the  subject  term and  a  quality  in  the
predicate  term.  However,  sometimes  an  ambiguity  of  linguistic  structure  makes
particular  and  singular  propositions  formally  indistinguishable.  Dewey  exposes  this
ambiguity to clarify the difference between the two kinds of propositions:
Singular propositions are such as determine this to be one of a kind. Take the two
possible  meanings  of  “This  is  sweet.”  When  the  proposition  is  particular,  it
indicates… an immediate [existential] change that has occurred or is about to occur.
The same expression when it presents the solution of a problem, means that “this”
is  one of  the kind of  sweet  things:  or  that  this has  the potentialities  which are
properties of any sweet thing. The sweet quality is no longer simply a change which
has occurred; it is a sign of a conjoined set of consequences that will occur when
certain interactions take place. (LW 12: 291)
84 Dewey’s example is a lightning flash:
The flash is certainly not recurrence in the sense of re-appearance of an object or
event which has presented itself before and which has endured in existence during
the  interval.  Clearly,  the  recurrence  here  is  practically  synonymous  with
identification of the flash as one of a kind. (LW 12: 247)
85 Each flash of lightning is existentially unique and one time only whereas the essence of
the kind may reappear. “Identification” here as Larry Hickman says,
[…] indicates a way of making something into something else. To put this another
way, it is the use of something as a sign to signify some further thing. (Hickman
1990: 127-8)
86 The making of something into something else is primordial rhetorical poiesis.
87 Dewey asks us to consider the difference between the morning star and evening star:
For in any case, the experience is unique and non-recurrent. On what grounds do we
draw  a  distinction  between  its  unique  character  and  the  identity  of  the  object
which is its subject-matter? (LW 12: 248)
88 Experience does not give the identity of the morning star and evening star. It is a matter
of evidential data, inference, and the contingent construction of kinds; hence:
The  only  conclusion  which  can  be  drawn  for  logical  theory  from  these
considerations is that the problem of the sameness of the singular object is of the
same logical nature as the problem of kinds. Both are products of the continuity of
experiential inquiry. Both involve mediating comparisons yielding exclusions and
agreements and neither is a truth or datum given antecedent to inquiry. They are
not only products of the same operations of inquiry but are bound up together. The
determination that a singular is an enduring object is all one with the determination that it
is one of a kind. The identification of a sudden light as a flash of lightning, of a noise
as  the  banging  of  a  door,  is  not  grounded  upon  existential  qualities  which
immediately  present  themselves,  but  upon  the  qualities  with  respect  to  the
evidential  function or  use  in  inquiry  they  subserve. What  is  recurrent,  uniform,  
common, is the power of immediate qualities to be signs. (LW 12: 248)
89 Avoiding “the philosophic fallacy” requires recognizing that the taking of signs to create
the identity of objects as instances of a kind depends upon commanding a mobile army of
metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms.
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Metaphor and Metonymy in the Creation of Free Will,
Causation, and Necessity
90 Recall  Nietzsche’s  definition of  metonymy in his  Rhetorik.  Let  us  consider  two of  his
examples. The first concerns the human property or essence of “courage”:
The audacia [courage] causes men to be audaces [courageous]; at bottom, this is a
personification, like that of the Roman concept-gods… These concepts, which owe
their  origin  only  to  our  experiences,  are  proposed  a  priori to  be  the  intrinsic
essences of the things: we attribute to the appearances as their cause that which
still is only an effect. The abstracta evoke the illusion that they themselves are these
essences  which cause the qualities,  whereas  they receive a  metaphorical  reality
only from us, because of those characteristics. (Nietzsche 1872-1873/1989: 59)
91 This passage portends Nietzsche and Dewey’s discussion of free will below. It also hints at
“the philosophic fallacy.” The following is the most famous instance of the fallacy in the
history of Western thought:
The transition from the eide [originally, shape or form of that which is seen] to ideai
[ideal forms] by Plato is instructive; here, metonymy, the substitution of cause and
effect is complete. (59)
92 Here, an eventual function of creative human inquiry, the empirical eide, is hypostatized,
reified, and then converted into a putatively antecedently existing higher order eternal
and immutable metaphysical ideai. In a dramatic reversal, Plato uses the higher ideai to
provide  causal  explanations  of  the  lower,  contingent,  changing,  and  imperfect  eide 
whence they originally derived. This endlessly recurring pattern characteristic of western
ontotheology depends on a failure to carefully distinguish our experience of existence
from the essences we create from it.25
93 Putative causes are imaginary anyway. Nietzsche explores, “The error of false causality”:
We believed ourselves to be causal agents in the act of willing; we at least thought
we were  catching  causality  in  the  act. It  was  likewise  never  doubted  that  all  the
antecedentia of an action, its causes, were to be sought in the consciousness and
could be discovered there if one sought them as motives: for otherwise one would
not have been free to perform it, responsible for it. Finally, who would have disputed
that a thought is caused? That the ego causes the thought. (Nietzsche,1889/2005:
59-60)
94 Nietzsche thinks our notions of causation are anthropomorphic; so does Dewey:
Labor  and  the  use  of  tools  seem,  however,  to  be  a  sufficient  empirical  reason:
indeed, to be the only empirical events that can be specifically pointed to in this
connection. They are more adequate grounds for acceptance of belief in causality
than  are  the  regular  sequences  of  nature  or  than  a  category  of  reason,  or  the
alleged fact of will. (LW 1: 73)
95 We saw in the last  section that logical  labor produces data,  characteristic traits,  and
objects as instances of a kind. It involves the skilled use of tools (instruments, an organon,
etc.), including the tropological use of language as well as logic and other instruments of
observation and experimentation. Causation is also an instance of poiesis requiring techne.
Labor involves transaction with the world. We should not confine it to “inner” thought, a
category of reason, or free will.
96 Nietzsche (1889/2005) finds a psychological explanation for metonymy in cause-effect
thinking that arises from human need and desire:
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Familiarizing something unfamiliar is comforting, reassuring, satisfy, and produces
a feeling of  power as  well.  Unfamiliar  things  are  dangerous,  anxiety-provoking,
upsetting,  –  the  primary  instinct  is  to  get  rid of  these  painful  sates…  The  first
consequence of  this  need is  that  causation gets  attributed to something we are
already familiar with,  something we have already encountered and registered in
memory.  This  forecloses  the  possibility  that  anything  novel,  alien,  or  previous
unencountered  can  be  a  cause.  –  So,  we  are  not  looking  for  just  any  type  of
explanatory  cause,  we  are  looking  for  a  chosen, preferred type  of  explanation.
(Nietzsche 1889/2005: 180)
97 In Dewey’s words: 
To explain is to employ one thing to elucidate, clear, shed light upon, put in better
order, because in a wider context, another thing. It is thus subordinate to more
adequate  discourses,  which  applied  to  space-time  affairs,  assume  the  style  of
narration  and  description.  Speaking  in  terms  of  captions  familiar  in  rhetoric,
exposition and argument are always subordinate to a descriptive narration… (LW 1:
216)
98 Causal explanation involves the arts of rhetoric. We do not simply explain something; we
explain  something  to  somebody.  Ultimately,  we  explain something  to  the  linguistic
communities in which we participate (e.g., technosciences, politics, academia, business,
etc.).
99 The  following  expands  Nietzsche’s  criticism  of  the  concept  of  causation  to  natural
science:
One should not wrongly reify “cause” and “effect,” as the natural scientists do…
according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press
and push until it “effects” its end; one should use “cause” and “effect” only as pure
concepts, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and
communication – not for explanation. In the “in-itself” there is nothing of “causal
connections,” “of necessity,” or of “psychological non-freedom”: there the effect
does not follow the cause, there is no rule of “law.”(Nietzsche, 1886/1966: § 21)
100 Elsewhere, he insists: “Necessity is not a fact but an interpretation” (Nietzsche 1901/1967:
§ 552).  It  is  easy to follow Nietzsche here if  we simply make the distinction between
existence and essence. Once we do, all substances including causation, audacia, necessity,
God, Rationality, and so on will all seem pretty much the same; they are the result of a
rhetorical process that has evolved into reified hypostatic abstractions. 
101 While useful, analytically distinguishing cause from effect in the course of logical inquiry
involves  separating  in  thought  an  existentially  continuous  temporal  process.  The
following passage is from the chapter on “Scientific Laws” in Dewey’s 1938 Logic:
The term “causal laws” is… a figure of speech. It is a case of metonymy in which a
law is designated not in terms of its own content but in terms of consequences of
execution of its function. By use of such a figure of speech, a rod of metal is called a
lever; a particular arrangement of a piece of wood and metal is called a hammer; a
visible white material phenomenon is called sugar, etc., etc. As has been previously
noted, even the objects of [commonsense] experience are habitually designated in
terms of the potential consequences of their familiar interactions with other things.
Common sense, however, is given to ascribing these consequences to some “power”
inherent  in  the  things  themselves  (an  ingredient  of  the  popular  notion  of
substance), and to ignoring interaction with other things as the determining factor.
(LW 12: 440)
102 Calling causal laws, and everyday objects a metonymy is to explicitly acknowledge the
role of poiesis and rhetoric in the logical construction of causation as well as objects like
levers and hammers.
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103 Causation is  something  constructed in  the  course  of  inquiry;  hence,  like  kinds,  it  is
something deliberately taken and crafted for our purposes:
[C]ausation  as  ordered  sequence  is  a  logical  category,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  an
abstract  conception  of  the  indefinitely  numerous  existential  sequences  that  are
established in scientific inquiry: – established by means of the use of generalized
propositions as laws.  For when events are taken strictly existentially, there is  no
event which is antecedent or “cause” any more than it is consequent or “effect”…
An event has to be deliberately taken to be cause or effect. Such taking would be
purely arbitrary if there were not a particular and differential problem to be solved.
(LW 12: 453)
104 Causation is a logical creation with many tropological components carried out for the
practical purpose of coordinating problematic situations.
105 We create a cause and effect series from the otherwise meaningless events of existence.
Once again, the decisive distinction is that between existence and the essences we create
from  existence  for  our  perspectival  purposes.  As  long  as  we  do  not  reify  our
anthropomorphic  abstractions  as  eternal,  immutable  essences,  it  should  generate  no
confusion. Our creations are part of “reality”; they are enduring, but not eternal. In The
Gay Science, Nietzsche observes:
Cause and effect. – “Explanation” is what we call it… We have uncovered a manifold
one-after-another where the naïve man and inquirer of older cultures saw only two
separate  things… In  every  case  the  series  of  “causes”  confronts  us  much more
completely, and we infer: first, this and that has to precede in order that this or
that  may  then  follow  –  but  this  does  not  involve  any  comprehension. In  every
chemical process, for example, quality appears as a “miracle,” as ever. (Nietzsche
(1882/1974: § 112)
106 In “The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality,” Dewey asks us to consider that
hydrogen  and  oxygen  coming  together  has  the  “effect”  of  producing  water.  Before
coming together, “they are absolutely unknown” (MW 2: 12). We can only “know them
through and in a process, exactly as analyzing water into them explains water in genetic
terms” (MW 2: 12). Philosophers fail to realize this,
[…]  because  an  older  purely  metaphysical  conception  of  causation  survives
according to which the cause is somehow superior in rank and excellence to the
effect.  The effects  are regarded as  somehow all  inside the womb of  cause,  only
awaiting their  proper time to be delivered.  They are considered as derived and
secondary, not simply in the order of time, but in the order of existence. (MW 2: 12)
107 Like  objects,  cause  and effect  relations  are  temporally  emergent  products  of  inquiry
wherein the cause only arises with its effect. 
108 For Dewey cause and effect is the product of processes that we may only comprehend
using historical method. Dewey writes:
The  simple  fact  of  the  case  is  that  the  genetic  method,  whether  used  in
experimental  or  historical  science,  does  not  “derive”  or  “deduce”  a  consequent
from an antecedent, in the sense of resolving it, or dissolving it, into what has gone
before.  The  later  fact  in  its  experienced  quality is  unique,  irresolvable,  and
underived. Water is water with all its peculiar characteristics, after the presence of
oxygen  and  hydrogen  gas  has  been  shown  to  be  a  necessary  condition  of  its
generation as much as before. (MW 2: 10-12)26
109 The genetic method allows us to better control the appearance and disappearance of
experienced qualities and connect them to other qualities that appear and disappear in a
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series of reactions. Dewey might have said, “In every chemical process… quality appears
as a ‘miracle,’ as ever” (Nietzsche 1882/1974: § 112).
110 Nietzsche agrees with Dewey that the dualism of cause and effect leads to confusion; he
also  agrees  about  the  indefiniteness  of  logical  sequences  we  could  create  from  the
continuum of experience:
Cause and effect: such a duality probably never exists; in truth we are confronted
by a continuum out of  which we isolate a  couple of  pieces,  just  as  we perceive
motion only as isolated points and then infer it without ever actually seeing it… An
intellect that could see cause and effect as a continuum and a flux and not, as we do,
in terms of an arbitrary division and dismemberment, would repudiate the concept
of cause and effect… (Nietzsche 1882/1974: § 112)
111 Nietzsche  and  Dewey  understand  natural  existence  as  a  qualitative  Heraclitian  flux
whence we create meanings and values.
112 We must realize that out of an infinite number of ongoing existential events, we finite
beings perspectivally select only a few aspects for our practical purposes of predicting
and controlling events:
An event has to be deliberately taken to be cause or effect. Such taking would be
purely arbitrary if there were not a particular and differential problem to be solved.
Given the problem of resolving a gross and indeterminate succession of observed
qualitative events into a single continuous history, there is sufficient and necessary
ground  for  taking  one  event  as  “effect”  or  consequent,  and  some  other  as
antecedent or “cause.” (LW 12: 454)
113 The cause and effect series we are most likely to construct from the vast continuum of
experience are those allowing us to familiarize something unfamiliar.
114 Dewey assails  necessity  as  much as  causation.  In  “Superstition  of  Necessity,”  Dewey
announces that “necessity” is logical not metaphysical; it has
[…]  relevancy  only  with  reference  to  the  development  of  judgment,  not  with
reference  to  objective  things  or  events…  [I]t  refers  to  the  content  of  that
affirmation,  expressing the degree of  coherence between its  constituent factors.
(EW 4: 19-20)
115 What is necessary and what is contingent depends on what we abstract from experience
and where we are in a given inquiry. The following brings Dewey’s emphasis on reason as
practical means-ends connections to the fore:
Contingent and necessary are thus the correlative aspects of one and the same fact:
conditions are accidental so far as we have abstracted a fragment and set it up as
the  whole;  they  are  necessary  the  moment  it  is  required  to  pass  from  this
abstraction  back  to  the  concrete  fact.  Both  are  teleological  in  character  –
contingency referring to the separation of means from end, due to the fact that the
end having been already reached the means have lost their value for us; necessity
being the reference to an end which has still to be got… Note that the necessity of the
means has reference to an end still to be attained, and in so far itself hypothetical
or contingent, while the contingent circumstances are no longer needed precisely
because  they  have  resulted  in  a  definite  outcome…  and  we  begin  to  see  how
completely necessity and chance are bound up with each other. (EW 4: 29)27
116 The  relation  of  parts  to  wholes  (mereology)  here  is  tropological.  Necessity  and
contingency like cause and effect is teleological in character;  both depend on human
purposes and creativity.
117 Dewey devotes only one paragraph to causation in “Superstition,” but it is worth citing
since it expresses causation’s anthropomorphic character: 
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It is but another instance of the supreme importance of our practical interests. The
effect is the end, the practical outcome, which interests us; the search for causes is
but the search for the means which would produce the result. We call it “means and
end” when we set up a result to be reached in the future and set ourselves upon
finding the causes which put the desired end in our hands; we call it “cause and
effect” when the “result” is given, and the search for means is a regressive one. In
either case the separation of one side from the other, of cause from effect, of means
from end, has the same origin: a partial and vague idea of the whole fact, together
with the habit of taking this part (because of its superior practical importance) for a
whole, for a fact. (EW 4: 36)
118 Causation and necessity are instances of metaphor, metonymy, and anthropocentrism.
 
Conclusion: Gay Science and the Genetic Method
119 By now, it is easy to recognize that Dewey shares Nietzsche’s devotion to gay science.
Dewey writes: “Scientific inquiry is an art, at once instrumental in control and final as a
pure enjoyment of mind” (LW 1: 9). Again, “science itself is but a central art auxiliary to
the generation and utilization of other arts” (LW 10: 33). Elsewhere, he remarks that 
[…] art, the mode of activity that is charged with meanings capable of immediately
enjoyed  possession,  is  the  complete  culmination  of  nature,  and  that  science…
conducts natural events to this happy issue. (LW 1: 269)
120 Dewey further states
Thinking  is  preeminently  an  art;  knowledge  and  propositions  which  are  the
products of thinking are works of art, as much so as statuary and symphonies. (LW
1: 283)
121 Gay science creates tentative, falsifiable, and contingent “warranted assertions” much as
we make pictures and poems.
122 Nietzsche and Dewey deploy the genetic method. One likely source of the method for both
was the evolutionary theories of the nineteenth century:
Genetic method was perhaps the chief scientific achievement of the latter half of
the nineteenth century. Its principle is that the way to get insight into any complex
product is to trace the process of its making, – to follow it through the successive
stages of its growth. (MW 9: 222)
123 Nietzsche’s failure to follow Darwin led him into such vitalistic errors as “the will  to
power.”28 Remarking on his contributions to Studies in Experimental Logic, expresses the
following regret:
One of  the  points  which gave  much offense  in  the  essays  was  the  reference  to
genetic method – to a natural history of knowledge… I was to blame for not making
the point more explicit. (MW 10: 361)
124 Indeed, he uses the phrase dozens of times in different places to describe his method,
although he does more frequently use “instrumentalism.” 
125 In  the  genetic  method  everything  continuously  emerges,  evolves,  and  eventually
eviscerates. Later, Dewey came to use the phrase “genetic-functional.” For instance, he
insists upon the
[…] compound word “genetic–functional” to describe what I regard as the proper
method of philosophy is, then, directly linked to the position taken regarding the
temporal continuum. (LW 14: 147)29
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126 For Dewey, there were no absolute existential beginnings, merely places our inquiries
reach their limit within a temporal continuum.30 Inside Dewey’s genetic–functional
method,  facts  (data,  characteristic  traits,  and  so  on),  habits  of  inference,  kinds,
properties, cause and effect, essences (entities, objects, ontology), genetic and universal
propositions, ends-in-view (that is, ideals of action), ideas, norms, theories, symbols, the
mental,  the  material,  and  much  more  are  all  subfunctions  we  construct  within  an
emergent  and  temporal  development.31 As  such,  our  creations  remain  not  only
permanently falsifiable,  but also contingent.  They are all  evolving events,  not eternal
entities – or, rather, what we call entities (concepts, ideas, ideals) are very stable, slowly
moving events.  Created,  these contracted events emerge and evolve in the course of
human inquiry that is the ongoing conversation of humankind.
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NOTES
1. Nowhere have emphasis been added to any citation. 
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2. Stephen  Toulmin,  one  of  the  foremost  rhetoricians  of  the  twentieth  century,  writes  the
Introduction to the Carbondale edition of The Quest for Certainty. See also Crick 2010.
3. There are important disanalogies. Dewey would reject Nietzsche’s nominalism, vitalistic will to
power, Übermensch, and more. However, their shared poetic perspectival empirical naturalism is
the topic of this paper.
4. For connections between Foucault’s genetic (i.e., historical) method and Dewey’s, see Rabinow
2011. Foucault freely acknowledges Nietzsche influence.
5. “Exaptation” is the process by which structures originally selected or adapted to perform one
function evolve to perform entirely different functions. See Gould and Vrba 1982. We may extend
the same idea to the evolution of cultural meanings and values. The so-called “genetic fallacy”
poses no problems for Nietzsche and Dewey.
6. Nietzsche and Dewey break the stranglehold the following Parmenidian maxim has had on
Western thought, “the same thing exists for thinking and for being” (See KR: Fr. 352).
7. Being  merely  lexicographer’s  entries  regarding  common  usage,  dictionary  definitions  are
rarely good enough for philosophical purposes. We start with such definitions of various tropes
to provide the reader with a sense of standard usage.
8. I acknowledge the ongoing debate over the value of Nietzsche’s largely philological Rhetoric.
Most and Fries have shown that the Rhetoric is largely a “collage” of work by other rhetoricians.
Since I am using the Rhetoric along with the OED largely to establish the culturally entrenched
usage of various tropes, this indebtedness to tradition works well for me. However, they also
remark on the importance of Nietzsche accepting Gustav Gerber’s assertion that all words are
originally  tropes.  They then note that  Nietzsche rejected Gerber’s  methodological  distinction
between the aesthetics of language and the theory of language while dramatically modifying his
tropological  interpretation by insisting,  “language is  rhetoric” (Most,  Fries 2014:  57-58).  Oddly,
they repeatedly characterize the identification of language with rhetoric as “totalitarian.” I say
oddly,  since  it  seems  to  me  to  render  totalization  impossible:  “The  possibility  of  rhetorical
deconstruction, which, as a result of this totalitarian sentence [“language is rhetoric”], seems to
offer itself up as a critique of any discourse in any field, effacing the borders between distinct
fields  of  knowledge,  is  thereby  related  to  its  own  preconditions  –  relegated  to  its  own
compensatory,  active  “poeticization...  Nietzsche’s  productive  insight...  puts  everything  in
relation  to  everything  else  but  at  the  same  time  revokes  the  foundation  of  the  individual
disciplines,  especially  philosophy...  In  this  sense,  the  collation  of  classical  philological  and
language-philosophic rhetoric, which we have understood as the deciding factor for Nietzsche’s
lectures on rhetoric, leads to a dead end” (Most & Fries 2014: 66). Strangely, one of the most
obvious things about the “totalitarian sentence” is that such anti-foundationalism leads directly
to French post-structuralism, which Most and Fries deride. It also leads to a rhetorical dead end
that helps prod Nietzsche into philosophy beginning with the philosophy of language found in
“On Truth and Lying.” James I.  Porter takes a different tack;  he wonders:  “Could Nietzsche’s
affirmation of the rhetorical essence of language itself be part of a larger rhetorical strategy?”
(Porter 1994: 221). He answers: “yes!”: “Rhetoric scandalizes thought and language because it
brings them back to our senses, confronts us with all their historical and contextual contingence,
and  renders  thought  both  materially  present...  and,  we  might  say,  materially intelligible  –
intelligible insofar as it has a material history, which is emphatically not the same as the abstract
and ideal intelligibility that thoughts expression would present by itself” (Porter 1994: 222). This
genetic, material, and contingent intelligibility disturbs Most and Fries. Porter concludes: “One
of Nietzsche’s aims in his essay ‘On Truth and Lying’ is to replenish the sensory dimensions of
concepts and words” (Porter 1994: 224). 
9. It  is  unclear if  Lakoff  and Johnson would countenance Nietzsche’s  first  stage.  However,  it
seems to me to express Dewey’s psycho-physical level of functioning quite well. Dewey states:
“Organic and psycho-physical activities with their qualities are conditions which have to come
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into existence before mind… They supply mind with its footing and connection in nature; they
provide meanings with their existential stuff” (LW 1: 220). There is no reason not to extend the
source domain for abstract mental functioning down to its “existential stuff.” 
10. Johnson  2007  emphasizes  the  primacy  of  the  aesthetic  encounter.  To  map  from  a
sensorimotor domain to an abstract domain is an instance of artistic creativity arising from an
aesthetic encounter.
11. The second half of Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks would have included “On Truth and
Lying” (see Cox 1999: 185, fn. 39).
12. Here,  we  will  not  consider  Nietzsche’s  eternal  return as  a  metaphysical  principle.  Many
scholars contend we should read “the greatest weight” exclusively as an ethical challenge. 
13. For more on Nietzsche’s rejection of self-identity, see de Man 1975.
14. Such  observations  also  confound  linguistic  neo-pragmatists  and  others  devoted  to
propositional  attitudes  and  the  like.  Language  is simply  an important  phase  in  the  creative
development of human experience.
15. Dewey rejects the very idea of pure reason: “Reasonableness or rationality has,  however,
been  hypostatized.  One  of  the  oldest  and  most  enduring  traditions  in  logical  theory  has
converted rationality into a faculty which, when it is actualized in perception of first truths, was
called  reason  and  later,  Intellectus  Purus. The  idea  of  reason as  the  power  which  intuitively
apprehends a priori ultimate  first  principles  persists  in  logical  philosophy.”  (LW 12:  18).  The
hypostatized  and  reified  noun  “rationality”  is  perhaps  the  most  influential  version  of  “the
philosophic fallacy.” 
16. Arguing  against  both  Nietzsche  and  Arthur  Danto  (1965),  Wilcox  contends  that  if  an
assumption is false a statement has no reference; hence, it is neither true nor false. He does agree
with  Danto  that  Nietzsche  rejects  the  possibility  of  a  metaphysical  concept  of  “Truth”  as
correspondence with noumenal reality behind appearances (Wilcox 1986: 343). 
17. Dewey indicates, “nerve-elements interact with external physical changes in bringing about
the occurrence of certain perceived qualities” (LW 2: 44). Dewey is comfortable with Nietzsche’s
first stage of metaphorical translation.
18. Dewey is thinking in terms of the classical Greek “aesthetikos” meaning sensory perception,
sensitivity, sentience, and feel. He rejects Kant’s aesthetics of the beautiful.
19. Dewey asserts: “A scientific description is logically adequate in the degree in which it consists
of a group of coexistent traits which so identify an object that anything having these traits, and
only those having them, is of such and such a kind” (LW 12: 239).
20. It is amusing to imagine contexts and purposes for which this figure works.
21. Of course, any simile may succeed poetically, post-structurally, or what have you. However,
in a world where over 99 % of all species (eidos, essences) that have ever existed are now extinct
practical consequences matter. 
22. Mathematically “pH” is the negative logarithm of hydrogen ion concentration. 
23. Dewey states: “The word ‘is’ in such instances as these has existential force not that of the
timeless (because strictly logical) copula” (LW 12: 289). Again, all is clear as long as we attend to
the existence versus essence distinction.
24. Dewey notes these are sometimes “called ‘Propositions of Sense Perception,’ although that can be
confusing” (LW 12: 291). 
25. It is also a constant temptation linguistic pragmatists and poststructuralist alike.
26. Dewey’s  two-part  paper,  “The  Evolutionary  Method  As  Applied  to  Morality”  has  many
remarkable similarities to Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals including the defiance of the “is” versus
“ought” and “fact” versus “value” dualisms.
27. Later, Dewey would use the word “situation” to designate what he here calls “fact.” A dead
body is Dewey’s example of a “fact” requiring resolution. The work of the detective is to form a
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warranted assertion (a judgment) from selected evidence used to carry out existential inferences
and formal implications to solve the case (i.e., resolve the doubtful situation).
28. See Moore 2002. For Dewey’s own critique of “the will to power,” see Dewey (MW 14: 97-100).
The status of “the will to power” remains debatable among Nietzschean scholars. 
29. See also (UP: 219, 321, 329, 331, and 334).
30. Dewey thinks, “it may be said that a question about ultimate origin or ultimate causation is
either a meaningless question, or else the words are used in a relative sense to designate the
point in the past at which a particular inquiry breaks off” (MW 8: 5).
31. Linguistic propositions are also simply subfunctions of the function of inquiry. Indeed, Dewey
insists,  “all  logical  forms (with  their  characteristic  properties)  arise  within  the  operation of
inquiry and are concerned with control of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions” (LW
12: 11).
ABSTRACTS
My paper focuses on the following famous passage from Friedrich Nietzsche’s “Truth and Lying
in a  Non-Moral  Sense”:  “What,  then,  is  truth? A mobile  army of  metaphors,  metonyms,  and
anthropomorphisms” (OTL 1). I will show that John Dewey entirely agrees with this statement.
Dewey and Nietzsche has a rich and novel understanding of metaphor, metonymy, simile, and
such that they use to comprehend the creation of linguistic meanings, the identity of things, the
creation of objects (essences,  eidos, etc.),  cause and effect,  free will,  and necessity as serving
anthropomorphic purposes. My conclusion presents Dewey as a gay scientist joining Nietzsche in
making creative use of the genetic method. The result of is a surprisingly poetic and rhetorical
interpretation of Dewey that should not astonish anyone who reads him carefully. We arrive at
this radical reading of Deweyan pragmatism by a metaphorical transfer from Nietzsche as the
more familiar source domain to Dewey as the target domain. All along the way, things will fall
into  place  if  we  carefully  distinguish  our  anoetic  experience  of  existence from  the  cognitive
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